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1 Introduction 
The University Grants Committee of Hong Kong (UGC) has asked whether CHEPS can 
conduct an update study on vouchers in higher education. The previous study on this 
topic by CHEPS (Ben Jongbloed and Jos Koelman) dates back to 2000. That study 
discussed the principle issues and theoretical backgrounds of funding higher education 
through vouchers as well as an overview of the practical use of vouchers in education 
across the globe. The envisaged current study should update this information with new 
analytical perspectives and most recent practices in higher education. 
Research questions 
The UGC particularly requested CHEPS to conduct a limited study into the model and 
potential experiences with some recent voucher-type practices in higher education. 
Addressing this question CHEPS thinks that the recent developments in Australia, 
Colorado, Germany and the Netherlands are most relevant.  
 In Australian higher education so-called learning entitlements have been introduced 
in 2005. In the same year, the tuition stipend was established by which Colorado’s 
college students will bring with them a state taxpayer-funded higher education 
voucher. Also in the Netherlands plans have been accepted by Parliament to adopt 
learning entitlements as from the academic year 2007-2008 onwards. In addition, we 
can elaborate a bit on the limited "voucher-experiment" in a limited number of Dutch 
colleges a few years ago, even though the result was “disappointing”. Also in some 
German Länder they try to limit long duration of study by levying fees for those 
exceeding the normative duration of study and by some form of vouchers called 
Studienkonten. 
 For most of these "learning entitlement" practices there are no results yet, so 
expectations should not be too high in that area. Nevertheless, the debates in the four 
countries which led to the actual implementation of voucher-type funding schemes can 
already be called remarkable in the background of higher education. 
 In the following chapters the concept of learning entitlements or vouchers will be 
further explored, the specific case studies will be described and some conclusions will 
be drawn. In Chapter 2 the basic ideas and principles of voucher type education 
funding will be addressed. Chapter 3 deals with the Australian case where in 2005 
learning entitlements were introduced. The Colorado experience is put in the spotlights 
in Chapter 4. Germany has shown a number of voucher like funding mechanisms in 
some of its Länder. This is discussed in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6 the Netherlands’ 
proposal for a funding system based on learning entitlements is discussed. This 
proposal has passed parliament but the Senate recently delayed the implementation of 
the system. Nevertheless, the debates and expected problems form an interesting case 
for looking at this issue. Finally, in Chapter 7 some overall conclusions will be drawn 
and put in a wider perspective of funding developments. 
 
2 Education learning entitlements1 
2.1 What are learning entitlements or vouchers? 
This report is about international experiences with learning entitlements. Basically, 
the term learning entitlements is a new phrase for what used to be called “education 
vouchers”. This means that we will use the terms vouchers and learning entitlements 
as synonyms in this report. Both learning entitlements and vouchers are used as a 
specific way of funding (higher) education. Instead of the government allocating 
subsidies directly to the providers of education, the government is channelling the 
subsidies through the consumers. The former – object subsidies – represents the most 
common way of allocating public money to education. The latter represents a way of 
subsidising the producers (schools, universities) though students (or their parents). As 
students can spend these subsidies only on education, vouchers in fact are an object-
subject subsidy, students do not experience an increase of their free disposable income. 
 In a voucher scheme the consumer receives a coupon (voucher) which represents a 
certain amount of money to be spent on education. The voucher is a kind of “coupon 
with a prescribed purchasing power, over a specified service” (Blaug, 1967). The value 
of the voucher is related to some notion of the average per capita costs of (a specified 
amount of) education. When a student chooses for a specific institution of higher 
education (HEI), the HEI redeems the value of the voucher(s) from the Ministry of 
Science and Education. The effect of vouchers is that HEIs can only acquire public 
means by attracting students and their vouchers. This implies HEI’s have to compete 
for public funds and students (or pupils) are encouraged to seek the provider that best 
satisfies their demands. In doing so they can choose from a range of providers. 
 Some authors, like West (1996), use a much broader definition of vouchers. In their 
definition one can speak of a voucher system whenever “funds follow the child (or 
student)”. This includes all arrangements in which governments make either direct or 
indirect payments to an educational institution whenever a student (or pupil) enrols in 
that institution. However, in our definition we exclude the direct payments and restrict 
ourselves only to the indirect payments. Thus, an essential element of a voucher 
scheme is that individual students are receiving government subsidies – either in 
terms of real money, or in terms of entitlements to a given amount of education – to be 
spent at the educational institution of their choice. Vouchers thus are a form of 
demand side funding. Student choice drives the funding. According to the broad 
definition of West a system of funding educational institutions on the basis of a formula 
where the number of students (or pupils) is the central parameter (i.e. the funding 
base) would also be a form of voucher funding. In our view, however, this would be 
regarded as a form of supply side funding. Following the voucher definition of West, 
voucher systems might be said to exist in quite a lot of higher education systems, e.g. 
in Chile, the Netherlands, or Sweden (see Carnoy, 1998; Parry, 1996 and 1997). 
However, in our less broad definition, these are examples of countries where in fact the 
supply side receives the government subsidies. 
                                                  
1  This chapter is mostly based on the previous CHEPS report on vouchers for the UGC Hong Kong, 
Jongbloed and Koelman, 2000.  
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 The crucial aspect of the voucher idea is freedom to choose and this, according to 
Barr (1998), would require that education is not just provided by public institutions but 
also – or at least in part – by private institutions. So, students would be allowed to cash 
their vouchers also at private institutions that – just like the public ones – comply with 
minimum quality standards. 
2.2 Pros and cons of vouchers 
There is no ideal method of funding education. Every system of funding arrangements 
has its advantages and shortcomings, partly related to the set of goals the government 
is pursuing. Moreover, the balance of argument changes over time. Dissatisfaction with 
the existing systems of (public) funding - e.g. no freedom of school choice in compulsory 
education with respect to public schools - has led, especially in the United States, to a 
number of suggestions for change, and perhaps the most prevalent of these has been 
suggesting the provision of vouchers for education (see section 3). 
 Vouchers for education is not a new idea. West (1967) traces its origin back to Tom 
Paine’s Right of Man (1790), although recent interest in the idea dates from the 1960s. 
In fact, there are many different voucher schemes, even though the differences are 
sometimes small. The modern development of the idea is usually attributed to 
Friedman (1962), an economist strongly committed to market forces as a means of 
allocating resources (see section 2.3). The most influential of other voucher versions 
usually is associated with the name of Jencks (1970). 
 Especially in the United States, and to a much lesser extent in the United Kingdom, 
a sometimes heated discussion has been pursued between proponents and antagonists 
of education vouchers. Both sides, however, agree that the effects of a voucher system 
would depend on the precise details of any scheme that might be introduced. In 
Mason’s (1975) words: “It is impossible to generalise from a particular voucher plan as 
the outcomes are a function of the very specific arrangements inherent in any 
particular plan”. 
 Even though the majority of articles about vouchers address vouchers in primary 
and secondary education and literature on vouchers in higher education is very rare, 
we will address some of the pros and cons of vouchers. Some of the arguments may 
perhaps be less relevant for post-compulsory education (including higher education), 
but it is good to take notice of them when addressing the relevance of vouchers for 
higher education. 
Advantages of vouchers 
The most important argument put forward in favour of vouchers is that they would 
increase freedom of choice. There is a widespread belief among economists, even those 
who do not necessarily support vouchers, that education is producer dominated in the 
sense that decisions as to curriculum, modes of teaching and assessment, for example, 
are taken largely by teachers or professors, though within the boundaries set by 
educational authorities, like ministries and accreditation agencies. Parents and 
students often do not have a strong direct influence on the content of teaching 
programmes and on the modes of delivery. It is argued that like a market system 
provides the kinds of goods consumers demand, its extension to education would also 
make education providers more responsive to the wishes of parents or students. Under 
a voucher scheme, the suppliers of (higher) education would be more responsive to the 
needs and preferences of their customers. This would help to create a wider variety and 
flexibility in the provision of education. Education institutions would have to provide 
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more information to parents and students on the quality of their services, thus 
strengthening the choices made by their clients and increasing the effectiveness of 
schooling. 
 The educational institutions which provide the kind of education that people want, 
will attract relatively more clients (pupils; students) and hence have more money to 
secure their existence. Successful providers would be able to raise the quality of their 
services (e.g. by spending on equipment or the teachers’ salaries), or perhaps to be able 
to make a profit. Vouchers would enforce the discipline of the market on the providers 
of education, just as it does on the producers of automatic coffee makers. The 
introduction of market forces leads to competition and competition will strengthen 
efficiency, because only the most cost-effective providers will be able to survive. 
 Protagonists of education vouchers often mention another advantage, namely that a 
voucher system will allow more money to be spent on education, even in times of 
financial stringency. If parents are allowed to “top up” the value of the voucher 
provided from public funds, then the total amount spent on education will increase, 
because many parents would be prepared to supplement vouchers out of their own 
private income. 
 Some proponents of a voucher system also claim that vouchers would encourage 
greater quality of opportunity. The reason for this is that inequality of opportunity is 
caused by the inability of the lower income family to buy itself out of a bad school and 
into a good one. Greater quality of opportunity would at the same time lead to racial 
integration. Open-administration policies (with over-subscribed schools allocated by 
lottery) and minimum minority enrolments in participating schools have been proposed 
to avoid racial pitfalls. The schools would be more responsive to the educational needs 
of minority groups (Davis, 1983).   
Disadvantages of vouchers 
On the other hand, opponents of education vouchers have numerous arguments against 
the introduction of vouchers. The first argument, regarding the issue of choice, is that 
parents are not competent to choose schools and to assess the quality of education 
provided, either because they are likely to be seduced by flashy marketing or because 
issues such as the curriculum are a matter for professionals.  
 Another argument against vouchers is that choice in education is limited by 
geographical factors in many areas. In rural areas there is often one school within 
reasonable travelling distance. Puckett (1983) notices that, curiously, the major 
voucher models under discussion have nothing to say about rural school participation 
in either a state-wide or nation-wide voucher program. Most voucher proponents have 
a metropolitan situation where diversity is possible (at least in theory) in mind. 
According to Puckett, in the U.S. voucher-type programmes have actually been in place 
for decades in rural areas (e.g., in Vermont). Such programmes have been implemented 
without the “fanfare” surrounding the Friedman and Jencks proposals (see section 2.3). 
In these rural areas a school district that only can afford one elementary public school, 
for example, allows parents to choose a school in neighbouring districts and then pays 
their expenses.   
 There are two additional arguments against the statement that a voucher system 
would increase freedom of choice. Firstly, according to Wagner (1974), choice is limited. 
He argues that all a voucher will do is to allow parents to state their preferences. If 
particular schools are over-subscribed then the actual decision will be made by 
someone else. In his opinion, increased parental choice, if required, can be provided for 
administratively without the need for a complicated system of vouchers. Wagner notes 
that the fundamental lesson about parental choice is that effective choice depends on 
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resources. If there are sufficient resources to allow spare places in popular schools, 
then choice can be ensured without any need for vouchers. If no spare places are 
available, then a system of vouchers will not create them. 
 Secondly, preferences may be incompatible. Allowing choice to one parent may deny 
it for another. For example, parent A wants co-education and parent B chooses single 
education. This may be impossible, because two small schools can be hopelessly 
uneconomic. 
 Another argument against vouchers has been formulated by Hough (1987). He 
argues that the longer-term effects of the introduction of education vouchers would be 
that the popular schools would need to expand, contract more buildings, appoint more 
staff, whilst the unpopular (public) schools would decline in number or even have to 
close. This will result in an inevitable waste and additional expenses with places 
available in half empty schools. In general, vouchers would confront schools with 
massive fluctuations in funding and enrolment, meaning that teachers would suffer 
from non-professional interference and job insecurity. 
 Also it is suggested that elementary school teachers would be tempted to re-orient 
their teaching in order to produce those results seen as desirable to those middle-class 
parents who are most likely to exercise influence and choice at the expense, for 
example, of giving extra attention to disadvantaged or slow learning pupils. 
 Even some proponents of voucher schemes, like Levin (1998) come to the conclusion 
that the costs of an overall voucher system appear to exceed those of the present 
system. Levin concludes that “the shift from the existing system to a voucher system 
with a well-functioning school market place in which adequate transportation and 
information is provided will demand considerable additional resources for education 
beyond those allocated for educational vouchers and instructional services”. Levin and 
Driver (1997) estimate that the public costs of a voucher scheme in a representative US 
context could raise public educational costs by 25% or more. 
 Most voucher models claim to ameliorate social disjunction. Opponents of voucher 
schemes, however, claim that the opposite will be the case. Vouchers would increase 
segregation, because all major voucher models contain mechanisms of economic and 
racial segregation. Society, from a moral and political view, can decide that choice on 
the basis of racial grounds is unacceptable, but choice on the basis of curricula, 
religious and moral values, or intellectual ability will lead to outcomes that strengthen 
segregation. Families that are better-off will be more likely to take advantage of school 
choice, leaving the worse-off behind (Puckett, 1983; Waring, 1996). 
 A final argument against a voucher scheme is that it would be accompanied by 
practical difficulties, especially because of additional administrative efforts. Vouchers 
imply a large effort in terms of keeping track of individual training careers. 
Final remarks 
From the short overview of pros and cons to vouchers it is difficult to formulate a 
conclusion on the relevance of vouchers in general. Even more so, because the effects 
generated by the voucher scheme will very much depend on the exact characteristics of 
the scheme (Oosterbeek, 1998). A large variety of voucher schemes can be identified. 
Johnes (1993), starting from a list of twelve basic questions that relate to the lay-out of 
the voucher scheme (see Appendix 1), argues that, depending on the answers given to 
these questions, over 4000 different voucher schemes can be identified. All of the 
questions relate to government regulation issues. Some of the most important 
regulation issues are: (a) the issue whether the voucher covers the full cost or only part 
of the cost of the programme or the educational institution, (b) whether there is some 
form of preferential treatment for disadvantaged families, (c) the selection mechanism 
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used to allocate student places in schools that are over-subscribed, (d) whether all 
parents can re-choose schools each year, (e) whether both public and private providers 
are included in the system, (f) the range of programmes that is covered by the system, 
(g) whether educational providers are allowed to charge fees on top of the voucher; et 
cetera.  
 Clearly all of these – and a lot of other – issues are important and would require 
detailed consideration if a voucher system were to be introduced. The next section 
describes a few of the voucher systems that were put forward in literature. 
2.3 Voucher models 
Especially for compulsory education, several different voucher proposals have been put 
forward in literature. Below we will discuss three well-known voucher models for 
financing compulsory education. For higher education, voucher schemes are rare. The 
most elaborated and consistent plan seems to be the model proposed by Levin (1983). 
This model, containing five key elements, will be presented in the next section.  
Two schools of thought 
Ever since Milton Friedman published his ideas, the voucher concept has received a lot 
of attention from contemporary economists. Friedman was the first economist credited 
with the idea of educational vouchers as a means of restoring market competition in 
education, while still having the government supply financial support. Following 
Friedman, several other economists, especially from the U.S. and the U.K., have 
further analysed the voucher concept. In fact, two schools of thought corresponding to 
two dominant final objectives of the voucher, namely the liberal market approach and 
the social policy approach, can be distinguished, represented by Friedman and, 
respectively, Jencks. The liberal market approach has dominated the discussions in 
both the U.K. and Australia. In the U.S. both approaches coexist.  
 An important similarity between the approaches of Friedman and – on the other 
hand – Jencks is that both are aware of the fact that the lack of competition in the 
public sector has an ossifying effect. Uneasiness exists about the constraining influence 
of bureaucratised education on individual parental decision-making. The only way for 
schools to perform better is – according to both Friedman and Jencks – a subjection of 
schools to more competitive pressure. Levin (1968) puts it in the following way: “The 
fact that the new left (Jencks) and the old right (Friedman) can occur on the same 
educational palliative is reason enough to consider the market approach as a serious 
alternative to the present system”. 
The market model of Friedman 
Friedman (1962) distinguishes between three kinds of education: compulsory 
education, higher education and vocational training. With regard to compulsory 
education he argues that this has to be funded by “giving parents vouchers redeemable 
for a specified maximum sum per child per year if spent on ‘approved’ educational 
services”. Regarding higher education, Friedman presents a similar proposal. 
Furthermore, he advocates freedom of price fixing (i.e. the setting of fees) by the 
institutions. In Friedman’s version the value of the voucher is the same for each child, 
and it can be spent in any school that has been approved to take part in the system. 
This would include both private and publicly owned institutions. The schools are 
allowed to charge supplementary fees on top of the value of the voucher and have 
complete freedom in their choice of pupils and organisation of waiting lists (entry 
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requirements, selection mechanism). According to Friedman the advantage of his 
voucher scheme is an increase of more effective competition between schools, resulting 
in an efficiency improvement, less claims of private schools on governmental financial 
assistance, and better opportunities to control governmental expenditure for education. 
 With respect to vocational training, Friedman argues that there are no 
‘neighbourhood effects’ (i.e. external effects) which would call for government funding. 
He claims that vocational training is an investment in human capital, analogous to 
investments in physical capital. Therefore, he advocates the establishment of a fund (a 
loan facility, or individual learning account) on which students have a drawing right. 
Repayment of the borrowed money should be related to the additional income that 
graduates earn as a result of the vocational training they received. 
This concise description of Friedman’s ideas about vouchers and the funding of 
education shows that he proceeds from a strict neo-classical framework. He pays a 
great deal of attention to efficiency issues and less to issues of equity, such as access to 
(higher) education. In Friedman’s voucher scheme, schools (or universities) are allowed 
to charge additional fees. This may lead to the effect that lower income groups can not 
afford to send their children to high-tuition schools. This ‘shortcoming’ has lead others 
to propose amendments to the Friedman voucher scheme. 
The income-linked market model of Peacock and Wiseman 
A well-known amendment of Friedman’s scheme is the voucher model of Peacock and 
Wiseman (1964). Although in their model freedom of choice for consumers of education 
is also a central issue, at the same time they are aware of the importance of access to 
education. Accessibility may become an issue if consumers, as a consequence of the 
right of schools to set their own tuition fees, have to pay higher fees than the value of 
their vouchers. Access to education then may become income-linked. In order to avoid 
such ‘unfair’ effects, Peacock and Wiseman propose to consider a voucher as a part of 
the taxable income “… so that under a progressive income tax system the rich would 
not retain its full money”. Of course, the most important question remains whether an 
income-linked voucher scheme does justice to the differences between income groups 
with respect to the ability to pay. 
 The principal element in this model is that the value of the voucher is higher for 
children from low-income families by making the voucher value subject to income 
taxation. However, although Peacock and Wiseman acknowledge the equality of 
opportunity as an important social objective, they explicitly opt for a liberal market 
approach. 
 In practice it is unlikely that the difference between the voucher issued to low- and 
higher-income families would represent the difference in purchasing power between 
low- and higher-income families. Jencks (1970) notes in this context that “legislatures 
may provide poor parents with slightly larger vouchers than rich parents, but (…) the 
difference is not likely to compensate the poor for their inability to spend private funds 
on education”. 
 
The compensatory market model of Jencks 
Jencks is the most articulate representative of the social policy approach, that 
emphasises the equality of educational opportunity as a policy objective. In Jencks’ 
opinion vouchers would offer an alternative for the failing public schools and would 
favour the relatively poor parents. The model he proposed has three main 
characteristics: 
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• It favours the market and competition among suppliers, but market competition 
ought to be regulated to become effective. 
• It introduces a compensatory element in order to avoid economic, religious and 
racial barriers and to promote social mobility between classes. 
• Schools where demand exceeds supply must allocate at least half of their places by 
ballot. 
 
The compensatory model is characterised by the fact that schools may not charge 
tuition beyond the value of the voucher. This implicates that schools accepting children 
from better-off families would not have greater income than schools with a 
preponderance of children from poor families. The opposite would be the case, because 
children from poor families receive a second, compensatory voucher that is inversely 
related to income. In Jencks’ scheme schools with pupils from low income-families 
receive additional funding. 
 The total amount of funding the schools receive depends on the number of students 
they are able to enrol. As mentioned above, schools are not allowed to ask or accept fees 
for education in excess of the voucher value. This holds true even in cases parents 
where are willing to supplement (‘top-up’) the voucher value. Due to this principle 
Jencks’ voucher scheme aims at prevention of social and economic segregation, i.e. 
children cannot be excluded because of the inability of their parents to pay. 
Disadvantaged pupils receive on top of the basic voucher a second, compensatory 
voucher. 
 The compensatory model of Jencks introduces the market mechanism to eliminate 
the prevailing monopolistic privileges of schools (in the U.S.). However, the market 
mechanism is regulated at the same time (fixed prices, compensatory vouchers) to 
avoid the negative effects of a completely free education market. 
Concluding remarks 
Above has been dealt with the essence of three voucher models. However, many other 
voucher schemes could be proposed (see e.g. Johnes, 1993). In voucher schemes there 
always will be a trade-off between individual freedom of choice (efficiency) and equality 
of educational opportunity (equity). Complete individual freedom of choice results in 
inequality of educational opportunity. Van Gendt (1990) formulated this dilemma in 
the following way: “Because of the situation that one instrument is supposed to be 
instrumental to two objectives that are not obviously compatible, one has to make 
concessions to the effectiveness of the instrument for one of these objectives or for two 
separate objectives.” 
 The Jencks scheme has more of an equalising effect on expenditure. Both exponents 
of the liberal market approach (e.g. Friedman) and the social policy approach (e.g. 
Jencks) are concerned with consumer sovereignty and efficiency, but proponents of the 
social policy approach, like Jencks, place more emphasis on distributional goals.  
 In section 2.2 it has been argued that voucher schemes, in the view of its 
proponents, will increase efficiency and enhance consumer sovereignty. Parents choose 
their child’s school and education is (partly) privately produced and competitive. 
Schools are forced to be responsive to parental demand. To opponents of voucher 
schemes, however, the efficiency advantages are debatable and the equity effects 
almost certainly undesirable. The efficiency issue is strongly related to the answer to 
the question whether parents are sufficiently well informed about the standards of 
their child’s school and, if not, whether a publicly organised inspectorate will be more 
effective judging the standards of public and private schools. With regard to equity, 
opponents of voucher funding argue that voucher schemes will increase inequalities in 
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the distribution of education (both quantity and quality) by social class, though less so 
in the case of a Jencks type of scheme than under a liberal market approach such as 
the Friedman model. As Barr (1998) notes, vouchers might well have advantages for 
middle-class families, but only at the expense of less-well informed choices by lower 
socio-economic groups. The equity issue therefore can be resolved to the question what 
relative weight should be given to the claims of these two groups. 
 Regarding voucher schemes, from our point of view two questions are of great 
importance: 
• What empirical evidence is available about voucher schemes? 
• Could the purposes that are underlying the idea of a voucher system also be pursued 
in alternative ways? 
Question A will be dealt with in section 3. Subsequently, in section 4, attention will be 
paid to question B. First, however, we will discuss in section 2.4 the concept of 
vouchers in higher education and other forms of post-compulsory education. 
2.4 Vouchers in higher education 
Most of the voucher schemes proposed in academic literature concern compulsory 
education. Regarding higher education and other forms of post-compulsory education, 
voucher schemes are rare. The most elaborated and consistent plan seems to be the 
voucher model of Levin (1983). The Levin model contains five key elements 
(Oosterbeek, 1998):  
1. Students receive vouchers (entitlements). Through their enrolment pattern they 
directly determine the amount of funding that higher education institutions (HEIs) 
will become. If a student spends a voucher to attend a specific programme at a HEI 
of his/her choice, the government is obliged to pay a pre-determined amount of 
money to the institution that offers the programme. 
2. A prerequisite for a HEI to be eligible for governmental funding is that it must be 
accredited. Not only regular institutions, however, are considered for accreditation. 
In principle, every supplier of higher education courses that meets specific quality 
standards can qualify for accreditation. This means that new suppliers get a 
possibility to enter the market. Furthermore, by not restricting accreditation and 
governmental funding to the traditional suppliers of higher education, Levin’s 
voucher scheme can also include on-the-job training programmes. 
3. The voucher is not necessarily a grant, but may also consist of a mixture of grant 
and loan. The composition of the voucher, in this respect, may vary with the type of 
programme and student characteristics. For example, for studies that generate 
relative large externalities (see section 1), the vouchers contain a large grant 
component. Moreover, based on equity considerations, it could be considered to give 
vouchers with a larger grant-component to students from low-income families. 
Another policy option could be to endow students with lower initial ability with 
more vouchers than the other students. Finally, it is important to note that the 
possibility of a loans component in the voucher scheme creates the option to combine 
a voucher scheme with a loan scheme (e.g. where repayments on loans are based on 
the income earned by the borrower). 
4. Vouchers retain their real value during the entire lifetime of the owner. This makes 
it possible to combine a voucher scheme with the policy goal of lifelong learning, 
which is becoming more and more important in a knowledge-based economy. 
5. Information plays an important role in a market system, such as a voucher scheme. 
Therefore, Levin is aware of the need to provide accurate information to demanders 
and providers of higher education and proposes to establish a special agency to 
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collect and disseminate information about institutions and courses in the higher 
education system. Potential students should have quick access to relevant and 
accurate information about programmes, course contents, costs, quality of teachers, 
labour-market position of graduates, et cetera. At the same time, suppliers of higher 
education programmes should be well-informed about enrolment patterns and new 
labour-market requirements. The same agency that collects and disseminates 
information about institutions and courses, could play the role of administrator, 
bookkeeper, controller and collector of the vouchers. 
 
According to Barr (1998), two questions are central for a discussion about vouchers in 
higher education. The first question is: are students capable of making informed 
choices? Barr comes to the conclusion that in higher education consumer tastes are 
diverse, degrees are becoming more diverse, and change is increasingly rapid. The most 
important reason for these developments is the increasing complexity of our post-
industrial society. In Barr’s opinion students are more capable than central planners of 
making choices on what they want to study and where they want to study. In his view, 
the goal of (increasing) consumer sovereignty can be regarded as more relevant for 
higher education than for compulsory education. 
 The second question is: how useful is competition? Barr concludes that it is a huge 
mistake to think that a simple-minded voucher model (HEIs compete for students; 
those who attract large numbers flourish, those who fail to attract enough students will 
not survive) is the only approach to competition. He argues that “vouchers should be 
thought of as a continuum, from 0 per cent constrained (‘law of the jungle’) to 100 per 
cent constrained (‘pure central planning’) or anywhere in between.” Policy-makers 
should consider a variety of constraints in choosing their position on this continuum: 
• Protecting subjects. Some courses (e.g. classics) need special protection, others need 
less protection. This can be arranged by tying some vouchers to specific subjects. 
• Protecting institutions. For reasons of regional balance it could be necessary to tie 
vouchers to universities in particular parts of the country. 
• Protecting individuals. There are good reasons to offer larger vouchers to students 
from low-income families. 
• Protecting quality. One of the bests arguments in favour of competition is that 
competition creates a strong incentive for HEIs to offer quality to their students. 
Nevertheless, at the same time it is important to protect standards, for example by 
monitoring quality and publishing the results.   
 
All in all, Barr concludes that vouchers allow governmental intervention to foster both 
educational and distributional objectives. The degree of competition is a political 
matter with different possible policy answers. We would like to add to Barr’s conclusion 
that vouchers are not the only approach to competition. We will work out this 
statement in section 4. 
 
3 Australia 
3.1 Wider policy changes in higher education 
Based on a review of Australian higher education in 2002, the Australian government 
introduced a number of higher education reforms in 2003.The backgrounds of these 
reforms can be found in the policy document Our Universities: Backing Australia’s 
Future.2 These reforms took effect in December 2003 when the Higher Education 
Funding Act of 1988 was replaced by the Higher Education Support Act 2003 (HESA). 
One of the elements of this reforms was the limitation of the amount of education 
Australian citizens were entitled to by the introduction of learning entitlements. 
The Higher Education Reforms 
The future direction of Australian higher education consists of an integrated policy 
framework based on the four foundation principles of sustainability, quality, equity 
and diversity (DEST, 2004a). The reforms with a horizon of 10 years aim at 
establishing a partially deregulated system of higher education in which individual 
universities are able to better capitalise on their particular strengths and determine 
the value of their course offerings in the market place. In short, the reforms are 
envisaged to lead to more market orientation and to make the system more efficient. 
 There will be renewed emphasis on teaching and learning outcomes, greater 
recognition of the role of regional campuses and institutions, and a framework for 
research in which all Commonwealth funding is either competitive or performance-
based. New arrangements for student financing will encourage lifelong learning and 
ensure equity of access to higher education. Also the market for private higher 
education will be opened up, while still enhancing quality control. Diversity will be 
encouraged through the creation of performance-based incentives for institutions to 
differentiate their missions. All of these ambitions are backed with new public 
investments in higher education, about $10 billion in 2005-2015. There are three major 
elements to the reforms. 
1. Support for higher education institutions. The Commonwealth Grant Scheme (CGS) 
will replace the current system of block operating grants to each university with a 
system in which the Commonwealth will negotiate with each higher education 
institution to deliver a specified number of Commonwealth supported places in 
particular course disciplines. This will ensure that universities provide the courses 
and the numbers of graduates that are needed by the nation. Each university will 
set its own student contribution levels (tuition fees) within the ranges set by the 
Commonwealth (see Appendix 2). To give higher education institutions more 
financial leeway, Commonwealth funding per student will increase, following 
institutions’ adherence to a set of National Governance Protocols and compliance 
with Commonwealth workplace relations policies. However, most of the extra funds 
are strictly earmarked and may lead to extra bureaucratic regulations and 
activities. Higher funding levels will also be introduced for student places at 
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regional campuses of public higher education institutions. There will be made 
available a substantial number of extra Commonwealth supported places. 
2. Support for students. Student financing will be extended to a wider framework of 
income contingent loans under the new Higher Education Loan Programme (HELP). 
All eligible Australians will receive a Learning Entitlement of seven years of 
equivalent full-time higher education (extended on a pro-rata basis if studying 
parttime) with an extension beyond seven years where a student is undertaking an 
initial undergraduate course or pathway in which the normal enrolment period is 
longer than five years (e.g. medicine at undergraduate or graduate degree levels or 
double degrees with honours). Also the Higher Education Contribution Scheme 
(HECS), through which students pay their tuition fees will be upgraded, including 
an increase in the repayment threshold, the income under whiuch graduates do not 
have to start repaying their debt, from $24,365 (2002/03) to $30,000 (2005/6). For 
the first time loans will also be offered to help students who are paying full fees in 
public and eligible private higher education institutions (FEEHELP). A third loan 
scheme will be established for students who need financial assistance to study 
overseas (OS-HELP). Commonwealth Learning Scholarships for educational and 
accommodation costs will remain to be offered. 
3. Support for a diverse and equitable system. Performance and incentive funding will 
be available to encourage universities to differentiate their missions and to achieve 
reform in the areas of learning and teaching, equity, workplace productivity, 
collaboration and quality. 
 
3.2 Student learning entitlements 
The previous section showed a whole package of reforms in higher education funding 
that accompany the introduction of student learning entitlements. 
 The Australian Commonwealth Government introduced the Student Learning 
Entitlement (SLE) in 2005 as part of the ‘Backing Australia’s Future’ (BAF) reforms to 
the funding system for university students in the Higher Education Support Act 2003. 
According to the Department of Education, Science and Training (DEST), “The Student 
Learning Entitlement” will provide greater opportunities for more students to gain 
access to a Commonwealth supported place as new entrants occupy places freed by 
students who have used their SLE. To encourage lifelong learning, an individual’s SLE 
will be extended after a specified number of years’ (DEST 2004).  
 Having a Commonwealth–supported place (CSP) means that a student’s tuition fees 
are subsidised through the Commonwealth Grants Scheme (CGS), with students 
required to contribute to the cost of their university education through a Higher 
Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) fee. Australian citizens and permanent 
humanitarian visa-holders are eligible for HECS-HELP loans. Other CSP students 
must pay their HECS fee up front (DEST, 2006b). 
 Upon enrolment in a CSP, students receive a Commonwealth Assessment Notice 
(CAN) informing them of their Commonwealth Higher Education Student Support 
Number (CHESSN), through which students will be able to track their SLE 
consumption. 
 Next to the Commonwealth student places, Australian universities (can) offer 
student places to students who are willing to enter higher education on a full-fee 
paying basis. This includes students who did not pass the entrance examination 
standards for the CSP places. 
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 Next to the learning entitlements, students can get help with paying their tuition 
fees, through the above mentioned HECS system, which makes graduates repay their 
tuition debt when they are able to do. In addition students can be entitled to loans 
and/or grants to help pay for living costs while they study. 
3.2.1 What are student learning entitlements? 
Student learning entitlements have been introduced to make students study and 
complete faster. By reducing the time to degree one could free up some capacity in the 
system to educate more students. In practice the student learning entitlements scheme 
comes down to the following structure. Australian citizens and permanent residents 
and New Zealand citizens who qualify for higher education: 
• are entitled to Commonwealth support for seven years equivalent full-time study 
(Ordinary SLE), 
• may be entitled to extra SLE for longer courses and/or postgraduate study once 
Ordinary SLE has been consumed (Additional SLE). Additional SLE can be awarded 
if a student is enrolled is an honours course, a graduate entry bachelor degree 
course, a postgraduate course or when a student had to take additional course units, 
e.g. when a course is being restructured. 
• can accrue Lifelong SLE from the age of 27 (DEST, 2006a). If, on 1 January 2005 a 
person was aged 20 years or older, he/she would begin accruing life long SLE on 1 
January 2012, and every 1 January thereafter. If, on 1 January 2005 a person was 
aged less than 20 years, the person will begin accruing life long SLE on 1 January of 
the year in which he or she turns 27, and every 1 January thereafter. The amount of 
life long SLE a person accrues on the first 1 January accrual date is 1 EFTSL and 
0,25 EFTSL on subsequent 1 Januarys. 
 
The ordinary SLEs must be first consumed before one could use the additional or 
lifelong SLEs. The student learning entitlements system applies to all inhabitants of 
Australia and New Zeeland and holders of a permanent residence permit. 
 SLEs can only be used for subsidised student places (Commonwealth supported 
places). Students who were enrolled before 2005 will fall under the previous 
regulations unless they interrupt their studies and start over again. 
3.2.2 Determining the EFTSL value of a unit of study 
Student learning entitlements (SLE) are calculated in Equivalent Full Time Student 
Load or EFTSL (DEST, 2004b). An EFTSL value for a unit of study represents the 
study load for that unit. A study load for a unit of study is expressed as a proportion of 
the standard study load for one full-time year of the course of study of which the unit 
forms part, as determined by a higher education provider. The aggregated EFTSL 
values for units of study undertaken by a full-time student doing a standard study load 
for one year of a course of study would normally add to 1.0. So a 4-year bachelor 
programme is a 4.0 EFTSL programme. Students doing more than the standard study 
load would generate EFTSL values adding to more than 1.0 for the relevant year of 
study; students doing less than the standard study load would generate EFTSL values 
adding to less than 1.0 for the relevant year of study. 
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 Normally the higher education provider specifies a standard study load per year of 
full time study.3 Where a higher education provider does not specify a standard study 
load, the standard study load for one year of a course of study should be determined by 
the higher education provider to be the minimum annual study load which, when 
aggregated with standard study loads for the other years of the course, would enable 
completion of the course in the standard number of years on a full-time basis 
 The EFTSL value of a unit of study is determined by calculating the proportion of 
standard study load which the unit of study represents of the total standard study load 
specified by the higher education provider for one year of full-time study in the course 
of study of which the unit forms part. In calculating the EFTSL value for a unit of 
study, higher education providers may allocate credit points to units of study offered by 
higher education providers as a means of identifying the relative value of a unit of 
study within a course of study. 
 The following example shows how the relative proportion of course units leads to 
EFTSL values for a particular student. Imagine that Unit A and B are offered on a 
semester basis and Units C, D and E are offered on an annual basis: 
 
Unit A = 2 Credit points 2/16 = 0.125 
Unit B = 2 Credit points 2/16 = 0.125 
Unit C = 4 Credit points 4/16 = 0.25 
Unit D = 4 Credit points 4/16 = 0.25 
Unit E = 4 Credit points 4/16 = 0.25 
TOTAL = 16 Credit points 16 1.0 EFTSL 
 
It should be noted that, in this example, the EFTSL values aggregated for a student 
undertaking Units A, B, C, D and E (that is, the standard study load prescribed for this 
year in this course of study) equals 1.0. 
 The EFTSL value for a unit of study undertaken at an overseas higher education 
institution is equal to the EFTSL value which would be assigned to the same or 
equivalent unit of study if it were undertaken at the higher education provider 
providing the course of study in which the student is enrolled. If students take part of 
their courses abroad, the SLEs are awarded to her/his home institution. 
 The additional SLE (expressed in EFTSL) that a person can get for an 
undergraduate course of study that has a course load of greater than six EFTSL is 
calculated as follows: 
 
Course load + 1 EFTSL - 7 EFTSL (ordinary SLE) - 
Additional SLE 
(expressed in 
EFTSL) 
consumed 
previously for 
any other 
course/s of 
study 
 
 
The additional SLE a student has for an honours course of study, graduate entry 
bachelor degree course, or postgraduate course (as outlined in paragraph 3.5.5 of these 
guidelines) is calculated as follows:   
                                                  
3  Higher Education study programmes are subject to a national quality assurance mechanism and 
institutional accreditation. 
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Course load - 
Additional SLE 
(expressed in 
EFTSL) 
consumed 
previously for 
any other 
course/s of 
study 
 
3.2.3 Information provision, registration and control 
Higher education providers must publish the timeframe in which they will consider 
applications  and in which they will notify applicants of their decision, for the re-
crediting of the person’s SLE.  The method of publication is to be determined by the 
higher education provider. The responsibility for checking the information lies with the 
higher education providers. They also have to check whether a student has sufficient 
SLEs left for the number of course units he or she applied to register. In addition must 
they within 28 days report to the ministry how many SLEs for a particular student 
must be noted as used. The whole administrative management is being conducted by a 
new organisation, the Higher Education Information Management System (HEIMS). 
3.3 The impact of Student Learning Entitlements  
In 2006 it may be too early to determine what the impact of the introduction of the SLE 
system has on students and the choices they make in terms of their pathways through 
higher education. Some general comments on the Backing Australia’s Future reforms 
include that extra funds in the system are strictly earmarked and leading to additional 
bureaucratic burdens. In addition, the extra funds made available for extra student 
places go to students who are already in the system, but who were not on (fully)  
subsidised places. Still, many eligible candidates cannot find a study place in 
university education and Australia is the only OECD country that reduced its public 
investments in tertiary education over the last decade (ALP, 2007). Australia is one of 
the most privately paid for higher education systems in the world today. The current 
government is looking for ways to back out of several of the so-called 'reforms', because 
no one is clear about the promised improvements of BAF (Dobson, 2006). 
 Looking more closely at the SLE policy, it is striking that no study was undertaken 
to see if such a scheme was necessary or even desirable. The reform was mainly driven 
by a political desire for control (Dobson, 2006). Most of the many millions of dollars 
involved just are spent on  increasing university costs for bureaucratic reasons without 
more funding going to teaching or research. Most of the reactions to the SLE reform 
come from the higher education institutions themselves. The major reaction is that the 
SLE and other BAF reforms lead to additional, repetitive and costly administrative and 
reporting requirements on universities (Monash University, University Planning and 
Statistics, 2006). For example, in an independent report commissioned of Phillips KPA 
by the Australian Vice Chancellors’ Committee, the SLE is criticised both for the 
reporting burden it places on universities and for being ineffective in its stated aim of 
spreading Commonwealth support for university students more equitably. The report 
states that the SLE appears to be of little benefit to students, providers, the 
Government or the public. It is a limitation on previous student entitlements and 
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delivers no additional funding or other benefits to providers. There is no evidence that 
it will provide significant savings or obvious policy gains for the Government, and it 
seems of questionable public interest given the unproductive costs involved in its 
administration. Entitling students to 7 years of full time studies in itself is absolutely 
not unreasonable. However, the compliance costs and reporting required from 
universities to maintain the program feels like “red tape engulfing universities” (Illing, 
2006). The  whole SLE system has been built on the assumption that universities and 
the ministry (DEST) can accurately track all students throughout their studies. 
Universities have to supply the ministry with extremely detailed information, per 
student, per course, per teaching department and per discipline. They also have to 
provide revisions file for changes that took place during the year. This puts an 
enormous administrative burden on universities, departments and the ministry, for 
hardly any savings made in the whole system (Dobson, 2006). In addition students 
(and universities) are now also confronted with two streams of information, their 
higher education contributions and their SLE records (Monash University, University 
Planning and Statistics, 2006). 
 An analysis undertaken by the University of Western Australia (UWA) of the total 
load accumulated at the University of 16,000 students it had enrolled in 2005 indicated 
only five of that total would have exceeded their SLE, had the SLE limitations been 
made retrospectively. Given the courses studied by those students, it is also likely that 
the SLE would have been extended in each case. While it is acknowledged that it was 
not possible in the UWA analysis to include load undertaken previously at other 
universities, these figures suggest it is highly unlikely that significant numbers of 
students will exceed their SLE. Thus there are very serious policy doubts about the 
value of the SLE. With regard to the administrative consequences it is clear that the 
SLE system requires DEST and higher education providers to implement and maintain 
a system of unique national student identifiers, monitor and track each student’s 
consumption of their entitlement across providers and time, and report frequently to 
ensure that at any point in time the entitlement has not been exceeded. Each provider 
is also now required to develop and maintain administrative machinery to determine 
student requests for re-crediting of their SLE where they are unable to complete a unit 
of study for circumstances beyond their control (AVCC 2006, p.35). The current 
Education Minister, Julie Bishop, will take such concerns into consideration in a 
review of the impact on universities of the BAF reforms (Illing, D. 2006). 
 Regardless of the complaints about the administrative burden, the state Tertiary 
Admissions Centres, though which students apply for undergraduate courses, already 
incorporate applicant’s SLE information and are developing mechanisms through 
which to report to universities on any relationships between course applications and 
SLE weightings. As more recent student data becomes available, issues that will need 
to be monitored with regard to the impact of the SLE on student patterns of enrolment 
include: numbers of students, by type of fees, by discipline, by institutions, by types of 
support taken, by mode of study and how different types of SLEs are spent. 
 Up to now, some statistical analyses show that over the past years, the numbers of 
post graduate students have grown quite rapidly, particularly when student loans 
came available for full-fee paying students (Monash University, University Planning 
and Statistics, 2006). This is an interesting figure because that may imply that 
students who exceed their SLEs may not have a serious problem in borrowing to 
complete their studies and thus not encourage them to study faster. 
 Altogether, the SLE reform so far did not yet bring the expected benefits of 
efficiency and a shorter duration of study. The concerns about “the perpetual students“ 
may not have been that strong a problem, or the design of the SLE system has been too 
generous for students. 
4 Colorado 
On May 10, 2004 the landscape of public higher education in Colorado was modernized 
when the College Opportunity Fund program was put into law. By linking state 
funding directly to individual resident undergraduate students, the Colorado 
Department of Higher Education is using this approach to improve participation and to 
create a fairer financial allocation mechanism within higher education. It aims to 
stimulate the consumer market and attract state citizens into public higher education 
by becoming clearer on the costs and subsidies in Colorado’s public higher education. 
With this policy change, Colorado is providing a greater level of government 
transparency to its taxpayers and raising awareness of how tax dollars are spent to 
provide public higher education. Additionally, the state wants to be transparent about 
the cost of higher education to potential students and their parents and express the 
state’s willingness to help fund public higher education. As such it hopes to start 
removing the financial barriers that often prevent students from entering the system. 
4.1 Wider policy environment 
It is generally regarded that participation in higher education is too low in Colorado 
(Colorado Commission on Higher Education, 2005). While ranking first nationally in 
the percent of population over age 25 who have received a baccalaureate degree or 
higher, Colorado only ranks 27th in the number of high school freshmen who enter 
higher education within 4 years (US Bureau Sensus, 2003; National Center for Public 
Policy and Higher Education, 2002). Therefore, the Colorado Commission on Higher 
Education has taken a multi-year state wide initiative, known as the “College In 
Colorado” campaign, to dramatically increase the number of Colorado students who are 
prepared for, enroll in, and graduate from college. This programme involves many 
stakeholders, like secondary education, parents, higher education, philanthropy, 
businesses and workforce development. The objectives are clear: to eliminate college 
access barriers, particularly for underserved students (low-income, minority and 
males); to ensure Colorado students are academically prepared for, go to and graduate 
from college; and, to create a better-skilled workforce. Among the major components of 
College in Colorado are: an entrance examination test which is used as an 
accountability tool for schools; to provide remediation programs for potential students 
with deficiencies to prevent dropout later on; assessment of pre-college preparatory 
programs; upgrade the academic preparation in secondary education; financial support 
for low-income students to prepare academically; and to provide information about 
college education to underserved groups of students and their parents in a more 
structured way. 
 Colorado’s transition to a new funding mechanism has been 20 years in the making. 
The debate began in 1981 with the release of a policy analysis exploring alternative 
funding methods for public higher education. While most of these alternatives spanned 
more traditional fiscal policies, the report also discussed direct student appropriations, 
through vouchers(Colorado Commission on Higher Education, 1981). 
 Led by Colorado Governor Bill Owens, Colorado established a new social contract by 
demystifying college, improving access with a particular emphasis on higher 
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education/K-124 linkages, strengthening accountability, and improving information to 
citizens and policy makers. 
 With regard to higher education itself, the government initiated a 3-tier approach to 
change the relationship between the government and higher education institutions. 
These include the tuition stipends (vouchers), fee-for-service contracts, and 
performance contracts. The tuition stipends means that from 2005-06 onwards, all in-
state undergraduate students attending public or participating private colleges or 
universities – be it a local community college or the flagship campus of the University 
of Colorado – receive a tuition stipend (voucher) from the College Opportunity Fund. 
The tuition stipend will be $2,400 for a full-time student at state institutions and half 
that amount for a full-time student at a private institution. Part-time students receive 
a pro-rata stipend. The stipend replaces direct appropriations from the state’s General 
Fund to individual state colleges and universities. The amount of the stipend is set 
annually as part of the legislative budget process. All resident students going to a 
public college or university qualify for exactly the same amount, regardless of family 
income. The stipend is not financial aid. Need-based and merit aid continue to be 
separately funded programs in Colorado in addition to the stipend amount. The tuition 
program in Colorado is only for undergraduate students. Stipends do not apply to 
graduate programs due to the cost disparity among graduate programs. 
 This brings us to the second reform, namely the introduction of the Fee-for-Service 
Contracts. In addition to the funding that public institutions will receive from the 
collection of student stipends, they also have the ability to collect state general fund 
dollars by entering into a fee-for-service contract with the Colorado Department of 
Higher Education. These contracts allow the state to purchase “specified educational 
services and facilities required for the full development of Colorado's educational and 
economic opportunities”(Colorado General Assembly, 2004). Institutional programs 
that receive fee-for-service funding may not collect stipend reimbursement from 
participating students. It is allowed that the state purchases the following programs: 
• Graduate school; 
• Educational services in rural areas; 
• Basic skills courses; 
• Economic development services, such as career development and retraining; 
• Dual enrolment programs for high school students; and 
• Specialized services for professional degrees, such as dentistry, medicine, veterinary 
medicine, nursing, law, forestry, and engineering (Colorado General Assembly, 
2004). 
 
Thirdly, in conjunction with the tuition stipend program, Colorado has created an 
alternative to traditional state regulation of higher education institutions. Colleges and 
universities now have the choice: remain under the old, high-regulatory program or 
sign a performance contract that explicitly spells out how the institution will meet 
state goals in exchange for the state waiving many regulations. Not surprisingly, every 
public institution in the state opted for the new performance contract. Performance 
contracts are negotiated between each institution’s governing board and the Colorado 
Commission on Higher Education. The first round of negotiations, conducted in 2004-
05, resulted in four-year performance contracts. Requirements of the performance 
contracts include access, quality and efficiency, more specifically the following types of 
targets:  
• Require actual percentage goals in each contract for increased graduation and 
retention of students.  
                                                  
4  K-12 is the final year of seconday education. 
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• Require the institutions to report to the state how they are addressing the issue of 
recruitment, retention and graduation of underserved students, especially low 
income, minorities and males.  
• Require institutions to make most, if not all, general education core courses 
guaranteed for transfer to any other two- or four-year public college or university in 
the state. 
• Require that an institution’s core curriculum be reviewed by a group of academic 
professionals to determine course rigor and transferability. 
• Require that core curriculum courses which do not meet state standards of rigor and 
transferability be denoted as such in the institution’s course catalog. 
• Create a plan for implementing and utilizing a variable pay method for faculty. 
• Limit base tuition increases to levels necessary only to cover inflation and increases 
in mandatory costs (energy, insurance, salaries).  
• Allow tuition increases above mandatory costs only when specifically justified, 
itemized, and tied to access, quality or capital improvement efforts. 
 
In return for the adoption of specified reforms, institutions of higher education are 
granted greater flexibility and autonomy, particularly in the area of the approval of 
academic programs, quality control, and much of the capital construction approval 
process. 
4.2 Why tuition stipends? 
For Colorado, there were two compelling reasons for adopting a tuition stipend 
program. The first is the public need to dramatically expand college access for 
underserved students – minority, low-income and, in many cases, male students. The 
two biggest barriers to college for underserved students were the lack of adequate K-12 
academic preparation and a perceived lack of affordability to attend college by 
particular groups of students. The financial barrier in many cases is often more a 
perceived problem than a real one. Low-income parents and students see headlines 
about double-digit tuition increases and the high cost of going to college which makes 
them feel they cannot afford college. For example, Dr. L.E. Penley President of the 
Colorado State University System stated (Penly, 2004) that one should promote access 
by providing clearer information about the price of college education because parents 
and students surprisingly often misperceive the price of higher education and the 
state’s role in supporting higher education. Some believe that their tuition pays the 
entire cost of higher education or even more than that. They do not see the hidden but 
substantial government contributions. As such, the Opportunity Fund will clarify the 
contribution of the state as well as the tuition that remains for parents and students to 
pay” (Penly, 2004). 
 Research among underserved students and parents revealed that they are 
completely unaware that state taxpayers subsidize the cost of a college education. 
When it was explained that they could have a $2,400 per year stipend, and that the 
money is set aside for students to use it or lose it, perceptions changed. Simply put, 
stipends give underserved parents and students a vested interest in their own tax 
dollars when it comes to paying for college. With the tuition stipend program, taxpayer 
subsidies to public higher education become much more visible now students and 
parents understand they are subsidised with $2,400 per annum. This makes them 
question how the stipend relates to total tuition costs encouraging a public debate on 
costs, public subsidies, financial aid and making college affordable for students, even 
traditionally underserved student populations. 
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 Second, tuition stipends in Colorado create a new type of competition for in-state 
Colorado students. Before, institutions were subsidized by direct government 
appropriations based partly on their enrolment, but also on what powerful legislators 
or special interests were able to squeeze out of the budget for their favourite campus. 
Under the new system, tuition stipends directly and explicitly fund all undergraduate 
education on an individual student basis. If an institution can attract in-state students, 
they receive funding. If one does not, one will lose taxpayer subsidies. This shifts the 
whole financial focus of colleges and universities. From 2005 onwards, all time and 
attention spent on lobbying can now be spent on attracting students. It is hoped that 
this stronger focus on students will increase quality and relevance of education. 
4.3 The tuition stipends 
In the fall of 2005, Colorado changed its funding system for public higher education to 
a student-stipend program known as the College Opportunity Fund. Under the new 
system, the state no longer provides direct lump-sum funding to its public institutions 
for undergraduate education. Instead, public funds are provided to public and private 
higher education institutions on behalf of resident undergraduate students in the form 
of a tuition stipend. Stipends are set annually by the General Assembly during the 
state’s budget process. The allocation is defined on a credit hour basis where the 
advertised amount is representative of a fulltime student taking 30 credit hours each 
year. For the 2005-06 academic year, the state provided each participating student 
with a $2,400 stipend or $80 a credit hour. This includes the full public subsidy for the 
higher education institutions including teaching, research and capital expenditure. 
Each student receives an account of 145 lifetime credit hours that may be applied 
toward the cost of total in-state tuition for undergraduate degree programming. Caps 
do not exist on the number of credit hours that a student may take in any given 
academic year. Students who are unable to complete a baccalaureate degree within 145 
credit hours may apply for a tuition waiver through either their institution or the 
Colorado Commission on Higher Education who decide whether the student has had 
exceptional circumstances, like illness. Those students who are not provided a waiver 
will be required to pay the full cost of instate tuition for the completion of their degree. 
 Students who receive a baccalaureate degree after July 1, 2005 receive an additional 
30 credit hours that can be applied toward continuing education conducted at the 
undergraduate level. Outside of the credit hour cap, the stipends cannot be used for 
undergraduate courses that are cash or fee-for-service funded. 
 Under the College Opportunity Fund, resident students receive a bill for the total 
cost of instate tuition, which includes both the student’s share of tuition and the 
stipend. While students might initially experience sticker shock by what appears as a 
substantial hike, in no way does the billing change represent a tuition increase or a 
decrease in the state’s tuition subsidy. What the change does provide is the ability for a 
student to see the amount of state support that is applied toward public higher 
education. Additionally, the change allows all students to receive the same financial 
backing from the state, no matter what institution they attend. That is a big difference 
with the previous funding structure in which the amount of state support provided per 
students varied by institution. 
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4.4 Students Attending Private Institutions 
A portion of the College Opportunity Fund program was established to provide Pell-
eligible students5 attending selected private institutions half a stipend. For 
participation purposes, these students must have graduated from a Colorado high 
school and be considered an instate resident. Private institutions that want to 
participate in the College Opportunity Fund program have to meet seven criteria: 
• Enter into a performance contract with the Colorado Department of Higher 
Education; 
• Participate and provide data to the Colorado Department of Higher Education’s 
Student Unit Reporting Data System (SURDS); 
• Be a not-for-profit college or university; 
• Not be pervasively sectarian; 
• Maintain its primary place of business in the State of Colorado; 
• Offer general Baccalaureate degrees in the Arts and Sciences; and 
• Be regionally accredited by one of the six national accrediting agencies. 
 
4.5 More market orientation in higher education 
By replacing the direct appropriation from the legislature to higher education 
institutions on the basis of tuition stipends and fee-for-contracts, Colorado has 
introduced market forces into higher education. Even more so, also the performance 
contracts encourage institutions to focus on enrolling, retaining and graduating their 
students by providing a quality, relevant education. Under the direct funding model, 
few such incentives existed. 
 The Colorado tuition stipends are the first voucher system in US higher education. 
The stipend replaces traditional direct legislative appropriations to the state’s colleges 
and universities. But stipends, as important as they are, comprise only one part of 
comprehensive pre-collegiate and higher education reforms in Colorado.  
 To bring transparency and competition to graduate education funding, Colorado 
adopted new fee-for-service contracts. Starting in 2005, the legislature now 
appropriates funding, not directly to the institutions, but to the Colorado Commission 
on Higher Education. The Commission then negotiates with each public school what 
graduate programs it will provide and at what cost. It is not an open tendering process 
in which all institutions put forward their wishes and then the Commission decides 
who gets how many places. It is more a bilateral negotiation between the individual 
institutions and the Commission in which also the statutory role and mission 
statement of each institution plays a role. Private institutions are not eligible for these 
funds. The Commission has the ability to ask tough questions, such as why does one 
college produce master’s level educated nurses for $5,000 each while another college 
requires $9,500 each for the same level of nursing education? For example, the 
Commission could choose to purchase more graduate education in nursing from one 
school over another – based not only on price, but also on quality. 
                                                  
5  Pell-grants are the Federal primary grants students receive for tuition and living costs. 
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4.6 The impact of the tuition stipends 
It is too early to see any clear changes in access and student choice patterns which 
represent an effect of the newly established higher education reforms and the tuition 
stipends in particular. Nevertheless, some up front investigations have been done, 
particularly by organising focus groups on the potential impact of the stipend reform. 
The findings of the panel can be summarised as follows (B. Benson, 2003). 
 Focus groups of low- and middle-income students and parents taught panel 
members and commissioners several things. First, high school counselors almost never 
talk to low-income students about higher education. Second, almost no one understood 
that the legislature funded two-thirds of every student’s tuition. All said that if the 
state would inform high school freshmen that the state would anyhow pay part of their 
tuition if they later would like to go to college or university, that would motivate them 
to stay, graduate and attend college (Benson 2003). This was a convincing reason to 
accompany the implementation of the College Opportunity Fund with a five-year, $15 
million marketing campaign to publicize public higher education. By using the College 
Opportunity Fund as the center of its marketing message, the government is 
promoting the idea that public higher education is affordable and accessible for all 
Coloradans. 
 During the focus group interviews conducted by an independent research firm, 
middle and high school parents and students made the following statements about the 
College Opportunity Fund program(Sterling Rice, 2002): 
_ “I like that money has been set aside for you and not the schools”  
_ “This show’s that they [the state] have a lot of faith in me.” 
_ “This is like we’re getting our tax money back…it’s our money.” 
_ “This gives you options…they [the state] want you to do what’s best for you.” 
_ “Colorado is ready to make an investment in you and your future…they’re here to 
help us.” 
 
Two years after its inception, however, there are some general observations that may 
indicate some preliminary effects of the voucher experiment and the wider higher 
education reforms: 
• To date, there is no concrete proof that the program works.  Most of the higher 
education institutions in Colorado are, however, experiencing a decline in 
enrollment two years after the programs inception.  This may have to do more with 
the improvement of our economy than anything else. 
• Unlike the package-deal like reforms suggested the Fee-for-Service funding is not 
tied to “performance contracts” of the institutions and is used to balance each 
institutions appropriation to an amount equal to what they received when the 
money came directly from the state. This means that the stronger performance 
orientation does not fully work yet and that the politicized traditional way of 
funding is still partly in place. But it is not to say that some items in the 
performance contracts have not moved forward, but in total, the contracts have not. 
• The legislative body of Colorado, the General Assembly, has recently talked about 
doing away with the stipend program, and just leaving Fee-for-Service contracts in 
place instead as many the program is a failure.  Time will tell what will happen. 
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4.7 Final remarks 
One common misconception of the College Opportunity Fund is that the stipend is 
equivalent to financial aid. However, this is not the case. The College Opportunity 
Fund is a new way of allocating the funds for higher education institutions. Student 
aid remains as it was and thus comes in addition to the tuition stipends. The only real 
new funding is the allocation of stipends to some participants at private institutions. 
 Important issues for the introduction of the stipend model were the following issues: 
• Changing the terminology from voucher to stipend; 
• Authorization for the General Assembly to set the amount of the stipend on an 
annual basis; 
• Restriction of the stipend to undergraduate education only; 
• Changing the life-time-credit hour limitation from 140 credit hours to 145 credit 
hours; 
• Implementation of performance contracts between institutional systems and the 
Department of Higher Education; 
• Implementation of fee-for-service contracts that would include all graduate level 
programs instead of the previously recommended Role and Mission grants; 
• Inclusion of undergraduate Pell-eligible students attending specified private 
institutions.  
 
5 Germany 
Germany and German higher education is divided into a number of different relatively 
autonomous states (Länder). This means that each state decides on its own funding 
mechanism for higher education. 
 Most of German higher education experienced a number of problems. Students take 
relatively long to complete their 5-year degrees, there are very high drop-out rates, 
there is a lack of student orientation in the system and the funding mechanisms used 
to be supply oriented. In the past decades, some general changes can be detected. 
Though all 16 Länder have their own policies, the trends are similar. The steering 
models changed towards lump sum funding, performance orientation and contract 
management. All resulted in greater demand orientation, for example visible through 
tuition fees for specific target groups, decentralised access policies and “money follows 
student” mechanisms. 
 The starting point for the voucher discussion in Germany was that changing 
incentives appeared to work by attracting more students to higher education, dynamic 
shifts in capacities, and internal subsidisation (Ziegele, 2006). In some Länder 
competition emerged between universities and universities of professional education. 
Finally, in the new Bachelor-Master model students and their wishes became more 
important. 
 Vouchers were regarded as an additional step in solving some traditional problems. 
First they would better serve the position of part-time students, they would also bring 
incentive structures within universities (internal allocation), and they would make 
students more aware of the costs of study and stimulate institutions to more 
transparency towards their students. In addition, vouchers could be a tool to bridge the 
borders of the Länder and as such address the problems of differences in demographic 
developments. Funding models should address these type of problems (Konegen-
Grenier et al., 2006). The main objectives of voucher models in Germany were to bring 
more competition and efficiency. 
 In some Länder public formula funding became extremely demand-oriented. For 
example in Hessen 80 percent of the state budget was distributed according to student 
numbers and a fixed price for different disciplinary clusters. The fixed price regime 
came close to the voucher idea (but failed because of an overall increase in student 
numbers which could not be financed with the given state revenues; constant prices 
had to be given up). But the most interesting case with respect to the voucher 
discussion is the Studienkonten model that was initiated in Rhineland-Palatine and 
further developed in Northrhine-Westphalia (NRW). This latter case will be discussed 
below. 
5.1 The NRW Studienkonten model 
Previously, every student in Northrhine-Westphalia was entitled to free higher 
education. To guarantee this basic right for students and to keep higher education 
affordable a system has been developed to reduce the duration of study of students. 
Since the introduction of the Studienkonten model higher education remains free of 
tuition for every student that completes his/her studies within a limited period of time. 
However, if one exceeds this duration one has to pay a tuition fee. 
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 Because students are put under time pressure in this system, it is expected that 
they will make better considered study choices in terms of the institution and field of 
study. At the same time it is envisaged that the institutions will better care about the 
quality of their programs as to enable students to complete their programs within the 
limited timeframe. 
5.2 What are Studienkonten? 
Universities and colleges in NRW use Studienkonten as from the 1st semester 
(Sommersemester) in the 2004-2005 academic year. This system means that every 
student receives a number of study credits he/she can use to follow a first study 
programme or a Master program. Every student’s study account starts with 200 
credits, calculated as Semesterwochenstunden (SWS). Every semester a student follows 
an education programme at a college or university in  NRW will reduce its number of 
study credits (SWS), called a Regelabbuchung. The reduction in SWS will be in 
accordance with the general rule that a student can use 1,5 times the normative 
duration of the programme being followed. If a student follows a programme of 4 years 
(8 semesters) than the total of 200 SWS is divided by 1,5 x 8 = 12. That implies that for 
every enrolled semester a student loses 16,7 SWS of his/her credit account. If one did 
not complete the programme within that period, then the student will have to pay a 
tuition fee of €650,- per semester to stay enrolled and to complete the programme. A 
limited number of exceptions can apply to this rule which makes the student free from 
paying tuition fees after he lost all his credits. 
5.3 Who are entitled to Studienkonten? 
The Studienkonten model applies to all public higher education institutions since the 
summer of 2004. In principle will every student who starts a degree oriented higher 
education study program receives a study credit account. This applies to both the 
traditional Magister and Diplom studies and the Bachelor program. For students who 
after a bachelor degree want to continue in a Masters program there is a separate 
arrangement. For these students the Total of their bachelor and master program will 
be taken as a basis for the withdrawal of credits. For example: if a student completed a 
3-year bachelor for which per semester (200 / (6 x 1,5) = ) 22,2 SWS were withdrawn 
and the student now wants to follow a 2-year Master program, his SWS withdrawal 
will be reconsidered now using a total of 5 years as the base unit (10 semesters). The 
new withdrawal mechanism then will be 200 / (10 x 1,5) = 13,3 SWS per semester. This 
implies that when the student starts a Master programme, instead of a withdrawal of 
22,2 only 13,3 SWS will be withdrawn and thus her/his account will be corrected. 
 As said, a student does not receive a study credit account when one starts a second 
study program. In practice this means that students do not receive study credits for a 
second bachelor program, a second master program or a bachelor or master after one 
completed a traditional Diplom/Magister program. For these students the tuition fee of 
€650,- per semester applies. 
 Student who are declared as extremely talented by their secondary school or 
university can in special cases fall within an arrangement called ‘Jungstudierende’ 
which makes them fall outside the Studienkonten model and being free of paying 
tuition fees. 
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 Students who register for two studies at one institution will get only one credit 
account and credits will be withdrawn for only one of the two studies, base don the 
study with the shortest duration. 
 The Studienkonten model does not apply to PhD education. Students who aim at a 
doctorate fall outside the arrangement and will be able to study and do research 
without having to pay tuition fees. For professions that require two studies, like 
medical specialist, student scan get a second study credit account. Such studies are 
described in the law.  
5.4 Writing off SWS 
The writing off of SWS happens every semester with a predetermined number of SWS 
as described before and base don the nominal duration of studies. Students who 
already were enrolled in a study program at the time of the introduction of the 
Studienkonten model also receive a study credits account. This account however was 
reduced with the number of credits that corresponds with the number of semesters 
already studied. A student who for example already studied 2 years before the 
introduction of the new system started with an account of 200 – 4 x 16,7 = 133,2 SWS 
(with a Regelabbuchung of 16,7). Also students who started their studies in a different 
state than Northrhine-Westphalia but want to continue these studies in NRW will see 
the number of semesters they already studied being withdrawn from their account. 
 As from 2007 it was planned that the Studienkonten model will get into the second 
stage and than the standard withdrawal of credits will be replaced by an individual 
writing off scheme. That means that SWS will be written off only for the specific 
courses that were followed by each student. From then onwards, students will only 
hand in SWS for courses they really followed. 
5.5 Changing studies 
If students change studies within the first 2 semesters of a study than the study 
account will start fully over again. That means that student scan change studies within 
2 semesters without serious consequences. If one changes studies after the first 2 
semesters than these will just be written off the account. In principle students can 
change studies twice without consequences for their study credit budget. The First 
time during the first semester and a second time during the second semester. 
5.6 How do SWS fund the higher education institutions? 
Universities and colleges are financed through the Studienkonten model from 2004 
onwards. Based on the number of SWS that are allocated to students every faculty is 
allocated a particular amount of funding. In addition, higher education institutions 
receive tuition revenues from students who used all their credits. To prevent that 
institutions who have students with the longest actual duration before completion 
receive most funding, the tuition revenues are reallocated based on a few performance 
indicators, like the number of graduates and the average duration of study. This 
creates a system of performance funding in which institutions with the shortest 
duration of courses receive most public funds. 
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5.7 Experiences 
About 130.000 students did already take longer to complete their programs than 1,5 
times the nominal duration of their courses. As such they already fully used their study 
credits and had to pay tuition fees from 2004-2005 onwards if they wanted to complete 
their studies. Of these 130.000 students only 60.000 enrolled in that study year which 
implies that they either did not want to pay tuition fees because they were enrolled in 
higher education for other reasons, like entitlements to some social benefits as free 
health care.  
 From the beginning, the Studienkonten model had two problems. On the one hand 
the model proved to have high administrative costs, and on the other the model was 
politically introduced as an alternative to the imposition of tuition fees (Ziegele, 2006). 
Consequently after a change in government in NRW and a political decision to 
introduce general tuition fees in NRW at the beginning of the summer term 2007, the 
Studienkonten model was replaced by a regular funding model again. Almost all 
Universities and Universities of Professional Education (Fachhochschulen) decided to 
introduce fees at the maximum level of €500 per semester. Regardless of the return to 
a more traditional funding model in NRW, the political debate on the reforms to a more 
demand-driven funding model will remain vivid. This will be due to demographic 
developments which are differing quite a lot between the various German Länder. 
(Konegen-Grenier et al., 2006). 
 The Studienkonten model still exists in Rhineland-Palatine, the state where the 
model was invented originally. 
 
6 The Netherlands 
The discussion on education vouchers or learning entitlements dates back to the late-
1980s. Since then, vouchers have been seriously considered as a means of funding 
higher education in the Netherlands. Major stakeholders in the debate are the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Finance. Because they focus on an 
efficient spending of public means, they have a strong interest in matters as vouchers 
and student drawing rights, which are regarded as an effective way of allocating public 
funds to (higher) education. They argue that vouchers are the most appropriate way to 
let the money follow the preferences of students. It is expected that, as a result, higher 
education institutions and schools will attune their teaching services to the demands of 
students. Plans to introduce a voucher-based funding system have been developed 
three times in the Netherlands. The first debate took place during the late 1980s, the 
second during the late 1990s, leading to an experiment and the last one from 2004 
onwards. 
6.1 The late 1980s debate 
During the late 1980s, vouchers became a main topic in the Netherlands, mainly as a 
result of some dissatisfaction with the public funding mechanism of that time 
(Ministerie van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen, 1987). A number of problems were 
raised. 
 First of all, changes in the structure of higher education, for instance as a result of 
the large merger operations, required many changes in the general funding rules which 
made the system very complex and non-transparent. In addition, the funding system 
was based on the assumption that students complete their education within certain 
time limits. However, the mechanism did not account for the actual amount of 
education provided and completed. Furthermore, to combat the long actual duration of 
studies of many students, the study programs had been shortened in 1982/83 and 
students lost opportunities for flexible study paths and combining working and 
learning. A fourth problem concerned the fact that neither students nor institutions 
had an incentive to complete studies in time and thus students found all kinds of 
excuses to extend their studies and, related to that, student financial support 
entitlements. Finally, the funding mechanism only catered for standard students and 
did not reckon that many students change subjects or institutions after one or two 
years. All in all, the funding mechanism did not include incentives to adjust 
educational supply to the demands of students. 
The voucher proposals 
Based on this criticism, a new allocation model was to stimulate differentiation in 
higher education in terms of timing, duration, contents of courses and modes of study. 
Consequently, students would be allowed to choose a greater variety of study paths. 
However, incentives should also be directed at a completion of initial studies within a 
limited time frame and to facilitate lifelong learning. 
 For designing a voucher-like funding model for upper secondary and higher 
education a working group was installed (Werkgroep Vouchers, 1987). The working 
group concluded that such a system would be beneficial for the higher education sector 
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and that it could be implemented as well. The positive results of this working group 
were even copied into the official central higher education policy plan of 1988 “Ontwerp 
HOOP 1988” (Ministerie van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen, 1987). The major 
characteristics of the official government proposals for a voucher model included the 
following (Ministerie van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen, 1988): 
• All students would receive 189 study credits, including 168 credits for the nominal 
duration of courses and 21 credits for additional courses; 
• Students in study programs with a long duration would receive additional credits; 
• The credits would be valid for a period of 12 years; 
• The vouchers were supposed to be valid for initial courses, short courses and post-
initial courses; 
• If students graduate rapidly, they earn extra credits for post-initial training; 
• If students used all their credits or would pass the 12-years validity limit, they could 
follow higher education at 50% of its costs; 
• Finally, institutions would receive the autonomy to set their own fee-levels for post-
initial training, with vouchers representing only a limited and fixed amount of 
money. 
 
Reactions from the field 
The central goals of flexibility and opportunities for lifelong learning were received 
with great enthusiasm by the higher education sector. However, the idea of a voucher-
system met with a lot of concerns by various stakeholders, such as higher education 
institutions, students and the Education Advisory Council. The concerns were 
particularly directed at the relations between the government, institutions and 
students. The various stakeholders could not come to an agreement. After years of 
debate, the voucher proposals were finally turned down in 1991. The cancellation of the 
whole operation was based on the following arguments:  
• The technical and administrative burden of introducing the system was perceived 
too heavy. Memorising the administrative difficulties of a new system of student 
support in 1986, the risk of serious additional costs as a result of technical problems 
loomed large. 
• Secondly, it was regarded that vouchers not spent would imply an unpredictable 
and serious financial burden that could disturb the budgets of both the central 
government and the higher education institutions in one or another year. 
• Finally, the new Minister of Education (since 1990) did not believe that a voucher 
system would contribute to the new ideas about funding institutions based on 
outputs. 
 
6.2 The late 1990s debate 
During the 1990s the discussion on educational vouchers continued. Several 
stakeholders, research groups and the Ministries of Finance and Economic Affairs 
argued that the flexibility of a voucher-like system would very much stimulate the 
further development of the notion of lifelong learning and market mechanisms in 
higher education. Also the successive changes in the funding model, making public 
funding (partly) dependent on the number of new entrants and the number of 
graduates, could not take away the discomfort of inflexibility. In the funding models 
that run since the early 1990s, institutions benefit most from traditional students that 
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get their degree in a short uninterrupted period of time. However, if students interrupt 
their studies, either for work or other reasons, if they want to combine courses of 
different higher education institutions, if they change subjects or institutions or if they 
drop out, then the institutional funding base looses ground. This rigidity resulted in a 
renewed attempt to stimulate flexibility through the funding of higher education 
institutions. The Higher Education Policy Plan for 2000 (Ministerie van Onderwijs, 
Cultuur en Wetenschappen, 1999) proposed a new funding method based on study 
credits and an even further reaching voucher experiment, both applicable to the sector 
of the universities for professional education (HBO’s). As a result, after more than 10 
years of debate, a first attempt in applying vouchers in Dutch higher education was 
made with a real voucher experiment. 
The voucher experiment 
The actual experiment started at the 17th of January 2001. It primarily concerns a co-
operative effort of 10 institutions for higher professional education (HBO’s) and 6 
medium and small-scale business organisations (MKB). The experiment includes 1000 
students in the final two years of their program. The two major elements of the 
experiment concern the personal educational plan (POP) and the strong relationship 
with the business sector (MKB-Nederland / HBO-raad, 2001). 
 In the personal educational plan (POP), students together with the HBO-institution 
and an employer determine a tailor-made individual study plan resulting in the final 
qualifications required to get a degree. Students are given 84 vouchers, representing 
two years of fulltime study. These vouchers can be traded in for either learning 
opportunities in a working environment and courses to be taken at the 10 participating 
HBO-institutions. The flexibility for students in following courses at any of the 10 
participating HBO-institutions will  increase the competition among these institutions. 
The vouchers form an additional bonus on the regular funding for the institutions. 
 The strong link with to the medium and small-scale business organisations (MKB) 
is not only expressed through the opportunity of a dual learning and working structure 
for participating students, but also by the intermediaries (the so-called 
“regioregisseurs”) installed by the MKB and by the additional vouchers funded by 
hosting MKB-companies for following specific courses. Through the voucher 
experiment, the branche-organisations hope to strengthen their relationship with the 
higher education sector, to combat the problems of a tight labour market and to use the 
knowledge of students for innovations. As such they offer serious practical periods 
(jobs) for students wishing to follow a dual learning and working structure. 
Reactions from the field and an evaluation 
The reactions from the field to the current proposals and experiment are diverse 
(Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen, 2000): 
• The HBO-Council was very positive about increasing the emphasis on demand 
orientation in the funding mechanism. As such, the council is very co-operative in 
relation to the voucher experiment. 
• The student unions had some doubts. They particularly focus on the consequences 
vouchers may have on the content of study programs. If vouchers are going to be a 
feature of the Dutch higher education system, the students plea for system wide 
scheme, including all HBO- and university institutions and courses. However, their 
major condition for a voucher-like scheme is the transparency of the supply of 
courses and combinations allowed. 
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• The umbrella-organisation of private higher education institutions (PAEPON) 
argued that at least recognised (but not publicly funded) private higher education 
programs should also be asked to participate in the voucher system. 
• The Education Council was a bit more hesitant and preferred to wait until a system 
of accreditation is being well-developed. Such a system, based on the quality 
assurance procedures, is currently under construction. 
• Finally, though the ministry of education aims at a larger focus on demand driven 
funding also for the university sector, it seems that a lot of resistance can be 
expected from the universities to the idea of funding through credit points and 
vouchers. Since they mutually allow students taking courses at other universities 
and recognise the study credits, they prefer of a more global funding system based 
on the number of new entrants and the number of degrees conferred. 
 
In 2004 a final evaluation of the voucher experiment was published (De Weerd en Van 
der Velde, 2004). A central conclusion, based on interviews with participating students, 
was that students were enthusiastic about the added value of the voucher experiment 
as they had become owners of their own educational process, leading to stronger 
motivation and a better preparation to a dynamic professional market. There was 
substantial discussion about the question whether institutions should offer a more 
differentiated and transparent package of course modules from which students could 
choose. This would not directly imply demand driven education but a more refined 
supply of education services. 
 Another issue related to the integration of larger practical components with more 
intensive cooperation between SME’s and higher education institutions. 
 Both students and teachers did not expect a great impact of vouchers on demand 
driven education. The problem is that students do not exactly know what they need 
and what their experiences will be. Higher education institutions see problems to 
inform students in a simple and transparent way on what students can exactly expect. 
Education is too much of an experience good, particularly as students do not exactly 
know in what job they will end up. 
 The voucher experiment was not regarded as a true experiment because it was 
relatively easy for students to use their vouchers for relatively large study units. Real 
demand driven education would require more subtle course offerings to satisfy 
particular needs. Therefore more emphasis on the personal learning path (POP), the 
internal course elements needed, course elements one has to get from outside and the 
assessment of all of these require more attention in a more demand led model. 
 The experiment showed quite some attention for the POP as the most important 
element in demand led education. As students follow a more individualised course 
structure, this may have consequences for their individual assessment, which was/is 
not fully thought through yet. 
 Altogether, the experiment did not gain much attention and was not followed up by 
any further initiative. This could be because it was not regarded as successful, but 
these types of remarks are not announced. 
6.3 The currently envisaged learning entitlements model 
More recently the voucher debate was strongly revived. Within the whole debate to 
make higher education more efficient, to stimulate students to complete a degree 
within a shorter period and to limit the current problems of administrative abuse of 
funding principles, the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture proposed a demand 
driven funding mechanism in 2004, with learning entitlements at the heart of the 
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model (Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen, 2004). As from 2007/08 
onwards, it is envisaged that higher education institutions will be funded on the basis 
of learning entitlements, a sort of vouchers. 
The learning entitlements model 
The new envisaged model would provide students more flexibility, more freedom of 
choice and better quality (Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen, 
2004). The system is based on the idea that individual students will get a limited 
amount of learning entitlements which they can use to attend higher education 
institutions for half year periods. For a standard 3-year university bachelor programme 
this means 8 learning entitlements (the nominal duration of a programme (3 years) 
plus one additional year). For a 4-year bachelor at a university of professional 
education one would receive 10 learning entitlements. For a standard 1-year master 
programme they will receive 4 learning entitlements, thus the nominal duration of 1 
year plus 2 additional entitlements. In the period a student uses learning entitlements, 
they have to pay the nationally determined tuition fee of €1506 per year. If students do 
not complete the programme within their learning entitlements’ period, then the 
institution can charge them an institutional tuition fee up to €3000 per annum. The 
whole operation basically comes down to an instrument for the government to limit the 
right to publicly funded higher education. 
 The learning entitlement proposal makes part of a broader development towards a 
new law for higher education and envisaged changes in the student support 
mechanism. These latter particularly aim at creating additional loan facilities to cover 
tuition fees. 
 The learning entitlement system is sold to the public as to allow students greater 
flexibility and opportunities to determine themselves what programme and parts of 
different programmes suit best to their own profile. Next to that, a major advantage to 
the system is the stronger signal to students that attending higher education is an 
expensive privilege. The limited “educational budget” also urges students to make 
better and more critical study choices. In addition, it is a step forward in the direction 
of demand driven funding that better serves the wishes of an increasingly 
democratising student population (Jongbloed, 2005). 
 Since the launch of the learning entitlements proposal a heavy debate started. Many 
stakeholders were involved. Particularly the representative umbrella organisations of 
the universities and the universities of professional education stressed the heavy 
administrative impact such a system would have. Some studies on this issues also 
indicated that learning entitlements would lead to substantial increases in 
bureaucracy and to difficulties at the higher education institutions (Van Twist en 
Gelevert, 2006; Capgemini, 2006). This would even become worse if an alternative 
refined model of study credits would be applied and students would be able to shop 
around for smaller units of study. 
 Another argument against the learning entitlement model is that there are doubts 
about the coherence of study programmes. In theory it would be possible that students 
for a 3-year bachelor programme would combine 6 different half-year units from 6 
different faculties and institutions. Who would have to confer a degree and what would 
this stand for? Other issues could be related to the information available to students on 
their opportunities and potential combinations (Jongbloed, 2006). 
 End 2006, the envisaged system has been postponed with one year because the 
expected administrative burden for the higher education institutions was regarded to 
be to heavy to guarantee a smooth introduction of the new system (HOP, 2006). 
Particularly all changes made to the original idea, including all kinds of exceptional 
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situations made it difficult for the administrative authority, the Informatiebeheer 
Groep (Ministry of OCW, 2006). With the formation of a new government in 2006/2007 
the issue of learning entitlements has regained political attention in parliament and 
suddenly the plans were partially withdrawn and put aside for a undecided period. 
When the whole operation will be proceeded is uncertain, if it will at all. 
7 Conclusions 
Debates on higher education steering and management put increasingly emphasis on 
demand orientation in the way higher education institutions are funded. This has 
several reasons, first to give students a greater say in what happens in higher 
education institutions. If students can vote with their feet (money follows students) 
than institutions and programmes will take better notice of the (quality) demands of 
students. Second, if students get a greater say in the organisation and contents of their 
courses, this may enable them to study more efficiently as well as institutions will try 
to optimise their own processes. Thirdly, students will also get incentives to make 
better considered study choices as they would better see the financial consequences of 
their choices. Finally, it will improve the flexibility of students which is necessary in 
times when the student population is diversifying as well as the variety of demands 
from the labour market increases. 
 The most far-reaching version of demand orientation in education financing is 
vouchers or learning entitlements. Because the term vouchers gradually received a bad 
connotation in higher education debates, learning entitlements are more commonly 
used phrase nowadays. This report shows the debates, advantages, disadvantages and 
current practices in higher education. 
 Looking at the practice of vouchers and learning entitlements, a common remark is 
that in contrast with the strong debates on vouchers it is so disappointing that the 
number of actual practices and examples was so little in higher education. Recently, 
this picture is changing. In 2004, Northrhine-Westphalia in Germany started with a 
voucher like mechanism and as from 2005 onwards, Australia and Colorado (U.S.), use 
a learning entitlements model to fund public higher education teaching activities. In 
the Netherland far reaching plans for a funding model based on learning entitlements 
has been developed, but its introduction has been postponed due to administrative and 
political reasons. 
 The initiatives are still relatively new and thus it is difficult to evaluate the precise 
impact on the behaviour of students and higher education institutions. In all of the four 
countries, the learning entitlement mechanisms have been introduced to make higher 
education more flexible and efficient. Students should be given greater freedom to 
study what they want and where they want. Higher education institutions should 
become more responsive to student demands and therefore deliver greater quality. In 
addition, as the learning entitlements budget is limited, students are expected to make 
better considered choices and to study more efficient. An interesting extra objective of 
the Colorado initiative is to provide more transparency about the public subsidies going 
into higher education and therefore to attract more students to attend higher 
education. 
 The major preliminary outcomes of these systems do not point at a shortening of the 
average duration of study yet. It is not clear yet whether learning entitlements 
attracted more students and whether higher education programmes have become more 
flexible. The German and Australian experiences show that students not yet changed 
their choice behaviour substantially. In Australia this may be due to the fact that the 
learning entitlements budget per student is still very generous which does not 
stimulate the to study faster. They also do not yet use to opportunities to become more 
mobile. The Colorado experience shows a decline in student enrolments whereas an 
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increase was foreseen. This may be due to other reasons, like a stronger economy, but 
still. 
 As serious problem in all of the countries with learning entitlements is that they 
report a serious administrative burden accompanying the introduction of a system of 
learning entitlements. The bureaucracy and related costs are substantially higher as 
expected. This may be due to a system in which higher education institutions are 
required to provide an overly amount of information. Thus the learning entitlements 
look like being used by governments to strengthen their control over the institutions. 
The expected administrative burden has also been regarded as a major problem in the 
Netherlands and because higher education institutions often use different 
administrative systems, the introduction of the learning entitlements model was 
postponed with one year. 
 Altogether, the first experiences with the current learning entitlement systems 
show that one has to be careful about the administrative burden such a system can 
bring along. In addition, within a political compromise it may be difficult to design a 
system that will be flexible for students, but will be tight enough to stimulate students 
and higher education institutions to reach the objectives of efficiency and greater 
quality. 
 
Appendix 1: Johnes basic questions on vouchers 
Voucher schemes can vary a lot according to a multitude of factors. To classify vouchers 
systems, a useful start is to imagine answering the following 12 questions: 
 
1. Are schools which are currently independently owned and operated to be included 
in the scheme as well as those which are, at present, in the state sector? 
2. Are schools free to raise or lower the fees which they charge pupilas in response to 
demand? 
3. Are  additional ‘compensatory’ vouchers allocated to low income families and/or to 
otherwise disadvantaged pupils? 
4. In the case of secondary and tertiary education, it would be possible to make the 
value of the voucher allocated to each student vary positively with performance in 
examinations which serve as entry qualifications; is this done? 
5. Are parents allowed to ‘top up’ the value of the voucher by spending their own 
money on additional educational services? 
6. Does the scheme cover only types of education traditionally provided by the state, 
or are other forms included too? (Examples include driving instruction or music 
tuition). 
7. Can schools vary their entry requirements? For instance, would some schools be 
able to restrict demand by raising the grade point average required for entry 
achieved by potential pupils in their previous schools? 
8. Are pupils constrained to spend the whole value of their voucher at one school, or 
may they spend some at one school and some at another? For instance, a pupil (or 
her parents) may be dissatisfied with the teaching of mathematics at her school, 
and may therefore wish to employ tuition (at another school or at home) in that 
subject, while studying all other subjects at the school; may the voucher be split for 
use in such circumstances? 
9. Is the value of the voucher subject to income tax? 
10. Are schools which are included in the scheme required to offer scholarships to 
pupils from low income families? 
11. Are schools allowed to charge higher fees to pupils suffering an educational 
disadvantage (such as dyslexia or other lkearning difficulties)? 
12. Are schools whose staff are expensive to employ (for example because of their 
average age) compensated for this by way of a block grant from government which 
operates separately from the voucher system? 
 
 
Appendix 2: Tuition bands in Australia 
 
 
Table A1:  HECS discipline bands and maximum student contributions for students on 
Commonwealth funded places,  2007. 
 
 Student contribution band  Maximum student contribution  
Band 3: Law, dentistry, medicine, veterinary science  AUD$8,333 
Band 2: Accounting, administration, economics, commerce, mathematics, 
statistics, computing, built environment, health, engineering, science, surveying, 
agriculture 
AUD$7,118 
Band 1: Humanities, behavioural science, social studies, foreign languages, 
visual and performing arts AUD$4,996 
National priorities: Education, nursing AUD$3,998 
Note:    Universities usually set the student HECS fee at the maximum permitted by the Government. 
Source:   DEST, 2006c 
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